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Abstract 
This paper aims to identify within capitalism the “political aspects” that enhance, but 
also can undermine, the positive transformational power of innovation policies. As 
such, this paper follows the approach of Michał Kalecki in his 1943 paper identifying 
the “political aspects” that enhanced and undermined the positive transformational 
power of Keynesian full employment policies. Similarly, this paper provides a 
heterodox economic policy framework that identifies what government and business 
support as “innovation policies”. 
 
In this analysis, the role of innovation stems from Schumpeter’s long-run perspective, 
but incorporates the more dynamic cyclical short-term and trend perspectives of 
Michał Kalecki. This allows the introduction of the role of government in innovation 
via the approach to political economy devised by Kalecki for employment policy. The 
paper adopts this approach to critique the strategy of public innovation policy in 
general and to derive political economy implications for innovation.  
Introduction 
Innovation is the buzzword of the new century, used to express the dynamism of an 
organisation. The problem is the word has become so ubiquitous that it now simply 
means anything “new”, and mostly is just a form of “spin-doctoring”. Governments 
also have embraced innovation by supporting it with many types of policies as a key 
to industry, regional or national development. True innovation is transformational and 
provides the basis for using inputs in new ways that result in significant economic 
growth and has the potential to overcome the inherent conflict between growth and 
environmental damage. 
 
When John Ettlie did a web search (in February 1999) on the scientific database of 
titles and abstracts in the business and economics literature, he came up with 3,011 
entries. A web search of the same two words in cyberspace produced 248,840 “hits” 
(Ettlie, 2000, p. 30). A web search on 18th April 2007, more than eight years later, 
shows a phenomenal rise in the use of the term. Typing the word “innovation” into the 
EBSCOHOST site and searching all titles and abstracts revealed 3,446 business 
journal titles alone (and 31,579 conference papers). The Econ Lit site came up with 
another 13,748 economics journal articles (and 1,922 books). This provides a total of 
17,194 journal articles in economics and business. A cyberspace search via the 
Google search engine on the same day revealed 124 million hits. Yet, much that goes 
under the banner of “innovation” is something else. One area is called “new product 
development” in marketing and consists of new packaging or styling for the same 
product, new improved versions of a product, and new adaptations of previous 
products. Another area is creative arts and advertising that are based on specific 
creativity techniques. Yet another area is research conducted by universities or 
research centres. Still another area is developing problem-solving solutions by 
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consultants, advisers or analysts. All these are valid areas of endeavour, but not “true” 
innovation in the transformational sense. 
 
Innovation is very specific and has become the quintessential feature of commercial, 
political, economic, and business development. However, the diverse views and 
applications of the term innovation have shown very little understanding of what 
innovation is all about and how best to enhance its processes for the common good. 
Still the best definition of innovation comes from the Joseph Schumpeter, who began 
the modern-day research into innovation. In 1911 Schumpeter defined innovation in 
five forms: (i) new products unfamiliar to consumers, (ii) new methods of production 
or new ways of handling commodities (processes), (iii) opening up new markets not 
entered into previously, (iv) new sources of supply of raw materials or half-
manufactured goods, and (v) new organisation of the competitive structure of an 
industry (Schumpeter, 1938, pp. 63-66).1 All five forms are transformational as they 
lead to what Schumpeter called, “creative destruction” – destroying the old form and 
replacing it with a new form. This process is bounded by the specific institutions and 
political frameworks (or political economy) that influence the development of any 
particular innovation.2
 
  
How is innovation to thrive? O’Hara (2007, p. 15) recognises in the context of 
political economy that there is the innovation-competition dialectic that provides the 
dynamic force for innovation. The competitive search for profits brings forth 
innovation (or creative destruction) within the environment of instability and 
uncertainty inherent in all market systems. If innovation is not strong enough, 
accumulation will falter due to declining monopoly rents from the innovation. If 
competition is too strong, the monopoly profits become quickly dissipated so that 
adequate rates of return are not realised. This also threatens accumulation. The task of 
political economy is to understand how capitalism stays within these narrow 
boundaries in order to operate.  
 
Public and private institutions (conventions, rules, routines) exist to allow the system 
to continue to replicate itself. There are specific interventions into the innovation-
competitive dialectic to ensure the narrow boundaries are maintained for the 
continuation of innovation. Such intervention can be either commercial (e.g. Bill 
Gates monopolising information technology) or political (e.g. warfare needs for 
military technology). The task of the political economy of innovation is to critique the 
current situation in innovation policy and then to devise policy-induced interventions 
that serve the best interests of the broader community and not purely the narrow 
interests of some powerful commercial organisations and their political supporters. 
This will help to sustain the system within a certain politically acceptable range of 
inequality and instability. 
 
The next section outlines the role of innovation based on Schumpeter’s long-run 
perspective, and then incorporates the cycle and trend perspective of Michał Kalecki. 
                                                 
1 The economics literature generally supports this view of innovation. In the context of the discussion 
that follows, it is interesting to note that Kalecki (1954, p. 158) identifies innovation with a very similar 
list of phenomena to that of the five forms by Schumpeter. 
2 For example, the innovation path of military technology is heavily circumscribed by the particular 
needs of warfare, from Spartan hoplite to US stealth bombers. Jones (1987) explains these processes. 
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An outline of Kalecki’s political economy approach to full employment policies is 
then presented, which provides the inspiration and structure to the heterodox political 
economy approach to innovation policies developed in the following section. Then, 
the paper adopts this latter approach to critique the strategy of public innovation 
policy in general. Finally, political economy implications are derived prior to 
concluding. 
 
Role of Innovation in Kalecki (and Schumpeter) 
Schumpeter is recognised as the economist who put innovation into the centre of the 
economic process. Schumpeter (1939) is a massive two-volume thesis on the 
processes of innovation and their absorption into the capitalist business cycle 
mechanism. In fact, Schumpeter argues that there would be no business cycle were it 
not for the clustering of innovations that leads to bunching of investment in order to 
implement (or commercialise) these innovations. Rothbarth (1942, p. 225) reviews 
this work and accepts Schumpeter’s identification of innovation as the dynamic force 
“…destroying the mechanical Marshallian idea of a downward sloping supply curve”, 
since it is innovation that leads to increasing firm size and not increasing returns to 
scale. Thus, Rothbarth heartily approves of innovation as Schumpeter’s “impulse” 
factor in the incentive to invest.  
 
What Rothbarth rejects is the strict linkage between innovation and the business 
cycle, objecting to the idea that cycles are all due to the clustering of innovations, 
followed in strict ‘one-to-one’ concordance with bunching of investment. Rothbarth 
(1942, p. 226) sees in Schumpeter’s approach an “…excessive reliance on the 
influence upon the process of innovation of such variations in risk as are due to the 
trade [business] cycle itself.” In effect cyclical uncertainty creates strong dependence 
of innovation on investment through current profits - whether as equity funds or as 
leverage for debt funds. This is Kalecki’s “increasing risk” in terms of innovation. 
Then the whole technological commercialisation process involves the significant time 
lags related to investment decision-making that Kalecki always emphasised.3
 
 
Together these two elements of risk and time lag account for what Rothbarth calls 
Kalecki’s “adaptation mechanism” (p. 227). In this way, Rothbarth argues for a 
synthesis between Schumpeter and Kalecki as the starting point for examining the role 
of innovation. The profit link to investment, so crucial in all of Kalecki’s work, is the 
“adaptation mechanism” that enables the bunching of investment behind some 
innovation “impulse”. This turns Schumpeter’s supply-side process into one that is 
centred on effective demand. Thus, the influence of effective demand is based on the 
speed (related to time lags) and strength (related to risks) of the diffusion of 
innovation as determined by the ability that firms have to invest in innovation out of 
profits. 
Rothbarth’s assessment of Kalecki’s work was based on the complete re-investment 
of profits in his Version I of the business cycle from the 1930s. This was only the 
beginning of a major lifelong investigation into cycles and growth. In this version, a 
dampened cycle results with growth coming from exogenous shocks. Cycle Version II 
in the 1940s introduced semi-autonomous development factors, notably innovation, to 
“engender a long-run upward trend” (Kalecki, 1954, p. 151). Finally (two years before 
his death) in Kalecki (1968), cycle Version III makes innovation specifically 
                                                 
3 “Professor Schumpter is rather contemptuous of time lags.” Rothbarth (1942, 227) 
 4 
endogenous to the investment process, thus integrating the cyclical short-run with the 
long-run growth trend. For this final version, inventions that are commercialised 
through investment “add to profit expectations over and above those generated by the 
movement of demand in the course of the cycle.” (White, 1999, p. 347) White (1999) 
identifies two reasons in Kalecki (1968) to account for this. One is increased 
productivity in the form of process innovation that incorporates technical progress in 
new capital equipment, making the previous capital stock technologically obsolete.4 
The other is product innovation coming from the stimulus to investment arising from 
entrepreneurs wanting to be the “first to avail themselves of the technical novelties” 
and thus adding a new level of demand (Kalecki, 1968, p. 269).5
 
 
It is at this point when effective demand has been clearly established in the innovation 
process that Kalecki’s analysis can link back to Schumpeter. White (1999, p. 350) 
recognises “the stream of inventions underlying the process of innovation could be 
sufficiently erratic to provide the irregularity in economic behaviour necessary to 
produce deviations in demand and output from those anticipated by producers.” With 
the diffusion of successful innovations, Courvisanos (1996, pp. 114-39) shows that 
these deviations can be seen as triggers for cyclical investment turnarounds in periods 
when commitment of orders to investment is highly susceptible, either as too high 
(over commitment) or too low (under commitment). There can be reinforcement of 
this process by the inventory mechanism, in that any small upswing of an inventory 
cycle at the trough of a business cycle provides a favourable climate for the spread of 
investment embodying innovation. This is particularly helpful for explaining the most 
difficult aspect of any cycle, the rise out of a contraction. In this respect bunching of 
investment occurs as per Schumpeter, with the stimulus from clusters of “basic” 
innovations.6
 
  
Within this innovation-investment Kaleckian process is the basic model for cycles and 
trend of a capitalist economy with no state apparatus. Governments, by becoming 
heavily involved in innovation and investment policies add a political economy 
element to this cycle and trend which Kalecki did not explicitly develop. However, 
there is a political economy model that Kalecki developed in relation to employment 
policy and its impact on cycle and trend. The next section outlines this model.  
 
Kalecki’s Political Aspects of Full Employment 
What does “political aspects” mean in terms of economics? Let us first examine it 
from the perspective that Kalecki wrote about it in 1943 in the context of the Great 
Depression that was experienced through the 1930s. In his extensively quoted article, 
Political Aspects of Full Employment [PAFE] (1943), Kalecki developed a Marxian 
class analysis where the capitalist class prevails over the political institutions of the 
society. 
 
                                                 
4 Salter (1966) developed this aspect of process innovation that has been the basis of much research 
work in the area of obsolescence (see Bloch et al., 2007). 
5 White (1999, p. 350) identifies a third reason from a Sraffian perspective. This is the stimulus to 
investment “arising from changes in relative profit rates as a result of changes in technology.” 
6 Empirical work by Courvisanos and Verspagen (2002) supports bunching effect of investment (á la 
Kalecki) while identifying the clustering of innovation (á la Schumpeter) through patent data. 
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Kalecki identified various political “stop-go” actions operating over the period of a 
business cycle. That is why this analysis has been dubbed “political business cycles”. 
Profits begin to be squeezed at the top of the boom as consumption spending slows 
down. Capitalist entrepreneurs have the exclusive control of investment, and under 
these profit squeeze conditions they make the decision to reduce their investment 
spending, which turns the pure capitalist business cycle into a contraction phase. 
Keynesian macroeconomic policies provide the method by which this contraction can 
be prevented and full employment maintained. This is through stimulation of effective 
demand via raising government spending, reducing taxes and lowering interest rates 
(with increased money supply). These three policy instruments can be employed to 
affect an expansionary impact on the economy. 
 
Keynes (1936) expressed faith that the power of his effective demand idea will be 
used to stabilise the business cycle at full employment. Kalecki (1943) also 
recognised the powerful tool of effective demand management by government (since 
he developed this same analysis in 1933), but he also recognised the stronger power 
of business interests to prevent this from occurring. Kalecki specified three fears that 
capitalists have with Keynesian full employment: (i) Loss of economic control with 
businesses’ state of confidence reflected in investment decisions and the business 
cycle that they generate; public policy demand management would effectively deprive 
capitalists of their power to influence economic conditions and also governments 
themselves. (ii) Loss of policy control as governments extend their impact through 
their own investment spending into areas regarded as business’s legitimate sphere of 
influence (e.g. transport, public utilities). (iii) Loss of industrial control of the 
workforce if governments are able to maintain full employment over the long-run, so 
that ‘the sack’ ceases to play its disciplinary role for businesses. 
 
Applying these three fears, a political business cycle [PBC] emerges. Towards the top 
of the expansion phase of the cycle, the combination of profit squeeze and inflationary 
pressures manifests itself in a significant negative shift in the state of business 
confidence. This is reflected in profit rates falling, financial gearing rising and 
capacity utilisation falling as large capital investment projects come on stream at the 
time when consumption rates are slowing down (Courvisanos, 1996). Business 
interests enlist rentier interests to support them in having mainstream economists 
identify the economy as “unsound” (Kalecki, 1971, p. 144). Pressure is placed on 
governments to renege on full employment commitments and introduce the ‘stop’ 
elements of fine-tuning by using policy instruments to dampen effective demand. This 
ensures the demise of old capital stock and the reduction in real wages, essential in the 
renewal of capitalism.  
 
The ‘go’ policy elements of government stimulation in effective demand are then used 
when business interests enlist workers to support them in having mainstream 
economists declare a slump as detrimental to the economy. There would, however, be 
strong debate between all these supporters of stimulation as to the precise instruments 
and extent of their use. A stimulation package allows the cycle to move into a new 
expansionary phase, with new capital stock coming forward on the basis of innovation 
in newer technological developments. Old capital stock can then be decommissioned 
so that utilisation rates are manageable in relation to new investment spending 
(Galbraith and Darity, 1994, pp. 459-68). Kennedy (1973) provides empirical support 
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in the U.K (1953 to 1971) for a “predominantly” planned ‘stop-go’ policy approach, 
with technical errors due to poor forecasting playing only a relatively minor role. 
 
Steindl (1979), Bhaduri and Steindl (1983) and Catley and McFarlane (1981) use 
PAFE to explain the long-term implications of the PBC in terms of a ‘political trend’. 
These studies draw on the historical development of advanced capitalist economies 
like USA, UK and Australia to show that the shift in economic policies in the early 
1970s from Keynesian ‘stop-go’ policies to Friedman’s monetarism and neoliberalism 
is due to the same three fears Kalecki identified in PAFE. The difference is that in this 
version of the class-based PBC a longer timeframe allows what Mair and Laramie 
(2002) refer to as “feedbacks between capitalists and workers over the political and 
social tensions of full employment to work themselves through.” These feedback 
effects generate rent seeking behaviour by powerful monopoly control interests who 
form ‘distributional coalitions’ to shift profit shares upwards by establishing obstacles 
in the road to full employment. These coalitions reduce efficiency and depress the 
adoption of new technologies in an effort to skew the income shares. Mair and 
Laramie (2002) provides empirical evidence to reveal the end of the post-war ‘full 
employment’ stop-go strategy in the early 1970s coincided with the only significant 
period of income share turbulence. Aschauer (2000) sets out empirical evidence for 
the USA that supports this contractionary political trend with the decline of public 
investment since the early 1970s. Catley and McFarlane (1981) and Otto and Voss 
(1994) are two studies that provide similar historical evidence for Australia. 
 
The contractionary political trend enabled the capitalist class to assert its economic 
and social dominance over labour and to cleanse capital of inefficient and 
oversupplied old stock. This process varies in time over different economies, with the 
USA leading the way after the 1990-92 recession into a new age of active innovation, 
stimulating large private investment spending and generating a new expansionary 
political trend. This expansionary trend consists of a new dynamic in public policy 
governance that has a PBC perspective as governments support rearmament (and 
war), tax cuts for the rich, innovation-supported subsidies and allowances, and ‘cheap 
money’ in a fragile financial system. Kalecki (1945) identified these stimulatory 
policies, and they have now been reactivated by the USA at the start of the 21st 
Century. 
 
PAFE raises in policy terms what Harcourt (2006, p.147) calls the “Kaleckian 
dilemma”. As economists, Keynes and Kalecki both provided the policy tools and 
techniques that can ensure full employment, even with the concern of rising inflation 
as the economy reaches towards full capacity.Both recognised this threat and 
developed approaches to manage it. Yet, from a political economy perspective, 
Kalecki recognised that full employment is unattainable. Having a Marxist 
perspective, he accepted this dilemma as inevitable since it exists because of the 
contradictions of capitalism itself. 
 
Political Aspects of Innovation 
In this section, the PAFE approach is applied to innovation. Whereas above in the 
PBC story innovation played only a minor role, in this section innovation is the 
central character around which policy revolves. Immediately after World War II 
[WWII] all the developed economies pledged some allegiance to attainment and 
maintenance of full employment as the panacea for the inherent crises of capitalism. 
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This approach was rejected in the 1970s, with emergence of the contractionary 
political trend as described in the previous section. This, however, raised a significant 
concern as there was no full employment public policy geared to providing the 
stimulus out of troughs in the business cycle. The policy framework became one that 
was more closely related to Kalecki (1945), with government policy aiming to 
stimulate the private investment and technological innovation that comes with new 
capital equipment. 
 
Technological innovation is incorporated into investment theory as innovation alters 
the incentive to invest by changing the cost of production or altering product demand 
to raise profitability. Kalecki (1968) and Laramie and Mair (2007) both imply 
technical progress in their investment function specifications but only indirectly, the 
former by theory and the latter by empirical estimation. Salter (1966) links the 
inducement to invest to technological innovation by utilising a vintage capital model 
in which innovation is embodied in capital equipment. Thus, governments have 
developed innovation policies which aim to stimulate investment with innovation. 
Such policies work through various approaches like rearmament, innovation 
subsidies, tax credits, and supportive income tax cuts for the higher income groups. 
This shift from direct employment policies to stimulating investment policies is 
exemplified by the reduction in emphasis on tariff protection policies aimed at 
supporting employment in protected industries. Tariffs have been replaced by 
innovation policies which aim to guide and support transformation of the economy 
into a new technological age, while employment is seen in the role of a useful 
spillover (or externality) to the technological imperative. 
 
The “political aspects of innovation” [PAI] can be identified in all periods of 
capitalism, but it took on a much more significant role with the shift from protection 
to innovation. Conforming to PAFE, the PAI approach identifies three fears that 
capitalists have with innovation: (i) Loss of economic control with respect to their 
individual market power as innovation encourages new entrants that have the 
potential to reduce the incumbents’ market share and ability to control the market. 
Governments have various innovation policies to support the incumbents; research 
and development [R&D] subsidies to support incremental innovations, patent 
protection and other intellectual property rights [IPR]. (ii) Loss of policy control as 
innovation becomes distributed across society through the public institutions and 
public infrastructure that create the national innovation system. Governments have 
developed various strategies that support incumbents to regain some policy control, 
notably privatisation, public-private infrastructure programs and public contracting. 
(iii) Loss of industrial control of the workforce if governments maintain industrial 
relations policies that reflect the full employment-type high-union membership 
structure of the first twenty years after WWII. Governments have introduced new 
industrial relations policies aimed at supporting and encouraging “flexibility” in the 
workplace in the name of innovation. This flexibility relates to the ability of firms to 
alter labour cost and structures when they introduce new process innovations that 
require less (and more) flexible labour. 
 
As with PAFE, the PAI is a class-based approach that can be applied as a PBC. 
Towards the top of the expansion phase of the cycle, the negative shift in the state of 
business confidence identified above has implications for innovation. Incremental 
innovation is strongly working through all the industry sectors in order to reinforce 
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benefits of prior significant innovation with minimal new investment. Pressure is 
placed on governments to underpin minor innovation by increasing their efforts to 
ensure minimising capitalists’ loss of economic, policy and industrial power. 
Strengthening policies (and more effectively enforcing existing policies) that support 
incremental innovation can be applied in a boom period with minimal negative 
political repercussions. Such policies include increased privatisation with funding 
easily available; stronger pro-business industrial relations with fewer people 
unemployed; and greater IPR support for established large companies with greater 
competition from small players trying to come into the market. All such actions 
undermine “true” transformational innovation and encourage “spin-doctoring” by 
powerful commercial organisations. This ensures the sedation of radical innovation, 
preventing stimulation of new activity. Renewal is delayed. 
 
With the business cycle well into contraction, the circumstances for innovation have 
substantially altered. Limited new capital investment since the downturn from peak 
activity has resulted in very little innovation, despite much R&D and patenting still 
going on. There is a large corpus of knowledge that is not being commercialised, with 
attendant concerns that rates of return are falling from old capital stock. As some 
companies fail to sustain themselves through the contraction, the remaining firms 
begin to feel the pressure of potential new entrants eager to test themselves in the 
market that has been comatosed. Support for government stimulation in effective 
demand by economists and business commentators manifests itself in significant 
initiatives in the area of innovation policy. Strong debate on the nature and extent of 
this innovation-based stimulation will result in some form of stimulatory package (but 
within institutional constraints such as the contractionary ‘political trend’ identified 
earlier). Eventually new capital stock will come forward on the basis of 
transformational innovation incorporating newer technological developments. 
 
The PAI framework enables tracking of innovation over the period of a business 
cycle, and identifying the role government policy plays in innovation within the 
context of the cycle. This framework can be used to evaluate the policy situation in a 
country, region or specific industry. In the process, another version of the Kaleckian 
dilemma arises. Government policy has the power to encourage and support 
innovation as a driver of economic prosperity. However, the political economy 
perspective identifies in PAI the encouragement of minimal marketing-based 
innovation during the boom when profits and consumer demand could support radical 
innovation to lift the economy to another level, particularly in innovation that is 
ecologically sustainable (Courvisanos, 2005). A current political economy example 
that can be cited is Australia and the USA being the only two developed economies 
not to sign the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse emission targets; USA being the 
absolute leader in greenhouse emissions, while Australia is the per capita leader. Both 
see the economic interests of powerful incumbent corporations as being much more 
important than greenhouse warming and the consequent ecological destruction. This 
encourages the continuation of incremental innovations that have only marginal 
benefits to the ecology but maximum benefit to incumbent enterprises, while ignoring 
the massive potential ecological (and national economic) benefits accruing from 
radical pro-ecology innovation. 
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Political Economy Implications for Innovation Policy 
With developed economies accepting the Kaleckian contractionary political trend 
since the mid-1970s, governments have restricted severely their expansionary 
spending policies. For legitimation with the voting public, governments devised an 
alternative strategy for encouraging employment. This alternative pro-business 
strategy was described in the PAFE section as supporting rearmament and war, tax 
cuts, R&D and entrepreneurship, and lenient lending. The aim of this strategy has 
been to support directly the capitalist accumulation process through (respectively) 
defence contracts, private spending, technological change, and private finance. 
Innovation and private investment are the expected outcomes of this strategy. The 
USA was at the forefront of this strategy. Reagan’s StarWars project and the two 
Bush Iraq wars led the armaments spending, while a shift to small business 
development by President Clinton was reinforced by President G.W. Bush.7
 
  
The actual outcome of this pro-business strategy is mixed. There have been 
innovation and jobs growth trends in developed economies with varying degrees of 
success, but most particularly in USA, Australia and Ireland. This success has been on 
the back of the booming computer-communications General Purpose Technology 
(GPT) and massive growth in the Chinese economy. Neither came from this pro-
business strategy, but more fundamental world developments in computers and 
Chinese communism, set in train during and immediately after WWII. On the 
negative side, Kalecki (1955 and 1967) clearly identified the wealth gains of 
armaments-based industries with a high social cost related to inequality, corruption, 
unproductive ends, and entrenched monopoly power. Parker (2001, p. 382) also 
exposes the myth of the entrepreneurial economy, in that much of the small business 
growth is “attributable to ‘push factors’ including to outsourcing and downsizing by 
large firms and the changing sectoral composition of employment, rather than ‘pull 
factors’ associated with the superior dynamism of small firms.” Sylos-Labini (1992) 
notes the complementarity of small firms to large firms through vertical sequence and 
horizontal cooperation, ensuring that successful small firms are often symbiotically 
lock-step dependent on the industry that is dominated by the related large firms. 
Finally, Davis et al. (1996) present longitudinal data on US manufacturing to show 
that small firms exhibit high job destruction rates as well as high job creation rates, 
with no significant net jobs growth; but with higher uncertain career prospects and 
lower pay and conditions for their employees.   
 
Examining the business cycle itself, a boom generally leads to the sedation of radical 
innovation as previously small firms are growing through incremental improvement 
of their idea and larger firms attempt to defend their market position through minimal 
marketing-based innovations. Both types of innovation are carrying out rent-seeking 
behaviour with the assistance of government tax cuts and incentives, as well as 
subsidies and enforcing IPR (Stilwell, 2002, p. 225). In a cyclical contraction, many 
small firms disappear, while large firms attempt to reconstruct their highly indebted 
balance sheets without going bankrupt. In such circumstances there is less rent-
                                                 
7 “70 per cent of the new jobs in America are created by small businesses. I understand that. And I have 
promoted during the course of the last four years one of the most aggressive, pro-entrepreneur, small 
business policies…And so in a new term, we will make sure the tax relief continues to be robust for our 
small businesses.” (President G.W. Bush, Press Conference 4 November 2004; as quoted in Audretsch, 
2006, p. xviii) 
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seeking behaviour, but also very limited opportunities to take advantage of the 
innovation policies on offer. It as at the trough of the cycle that innovation policy is 
taken up for genuine creative opportunities by risk-taking entrepreneurs. The problem 
is that tangible benefit from innovation policy occurs only during the occasional 
trough of the business cycle. Genuine radical innovation is highly constrained. 
 
The PBC approach to innovation described above provides an appreciation of the 
dynamics of innovation encouragement and enhancement, as it is restricted within the 
boundaries specified by O’Hara (2007) in the innovation-competition dialectic. Only 
within these boundaries is the accumulation process viable. In a boom, strong 
competition and minor incremental innovation lead to quick dissipation of any 
monopoly rents. In a trough, innovation is tentative with great uncertainty about 
monopoly rents, and if the innovation is very successful, innovative firms need to 
work hard to prevent dissipation of monopoly rents. Across this dialectic spectrum, 
firms use public innovation policies to sustain their monopoly rents. Viable capitalism 
operates within the narrow boundaries of this spectrum, but this narrowness also 
severely limits the ability of innovation policies to “make a difference”. The aim of 
effective innovation policy planning would be to extend the boundaries of operation 
in the context of this dialectic without threatening the economy’s accumulation 
process. 
 
The cycle and trend patterns deduced from the PAI-based framework are general. 
This framework needs to be specified in particular economies, but to do this the 
culture and political system of an economy needs to be clearly delineated. Brown and 
Ulijn (2004) bring together a set of studies that show the interaction of innovation and 
entrepreneurship with specific national, professional and corporate cultural 
dimensions produces various patterns of innovation which, nevertheless, have 
commonalities. Thus, each economy portrays the dynamics of innovation differently. 
Each is but a variation on the theme of the political economy innovation aspects 
identified above.  
 
The politico-economic models by Frey (1997) can be used to identify themes around a 
group of economies that share important cultural and institutional elements. The 
English-speaking nations are influenced most strongly by the market-oriented 
contractionary ‘political trend’ that has penetrated all economies that operate within 
global markets. Scandinavian nations, China, India, Japan and other robust Asian 
economies have a relatively stronger commitment to public policy pro-active 
intervention. Mid-European nations like Germany, The Netherlands and France place 
more emphasis on economic stabilising elements based around European Union 
commitments and accords, but with some specific pro-active public policies. Southern 
European and South American nations have significantly less sophisticated economic 
and political institutions that have a mixture of all the above, but with strong 
personality-based parochialism. Within this broad-brush representation there are 
differences. For example, both Singapore and Malaysia set out to develop a 
biotechnology innovation cluster, yet only the former has been able to build “a 
significant hub of activity.” (McColl, 2007, p. 16) Also, Eastern Europe failed to 
sustain any innovation activity through its communist period despite much R&D 
spending and pro-active planning. On the other hand, in strong capitalist economies 
firms with monopoly power stymie innovation by locking-in technologies while 
exhibiting strong rent-seeking behaviour.  
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Conclusion 
Innovation is not simply technological (in process) and economic (in outcome). The 
political dimension casts a strong shadow over both process and outcome. The class-
based approach outlined in this paper identifies the capitalist elements that drive 
innovation from within its own reproduction system and the public support that 
ensures susceptibility to future risk is ameliorated. All this occurs within the context 
of the boom and bust of business cycles, for it is these short-term economic forces that 
influence the shape and form of innovation. Forces aimed at ameliorating the three 
fears of capitalists (i.e. loss of economic, policy and industrial control) are the basic 
dynamic of the innovation process. Kalecki’s political economy can be applied to 
innovation and a conjectural economic history of an economy or industry could be 
used to illustrate how innovation policies impact in the course of a business cycle. 
From such an analysis, economic policy for innovation can be understood from a 
broad heterodox perspective, which could then be used as a critical realist 
examination of innovation policy in capitalism or a pragmatist approach to a more 
coherent innovation policy framework. 
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